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ABSTRACT
Corruption is a global problem. Without effective legal regime, corruption 
would cost economic, political, and social instability. Based on the 
International Transparency perspective index on corruption, Singapore 
ranked 8th as less corrupt nation and scored 85 out of 100 based on the 
transparency index.  These data show Singapore as a leading country 
in fighting corruption in South East Asia region. Therefore, this paper 
intends to examine the legal regime in Malaysia and Singapore in order 
to identify the legal gap and propose an improvement and comprehensive 
legal framework against corruption.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption has become a global problem and the complexity of the crimes 
has evolved based on the economic development. Without any doubt, 
every country on the surface of earth experiences this global epidemic. The 
high number of corruption will not only affect the political, economic and 
social growth in the respective countries but also indirectly affect the world 
economic through unbalanced economic sharing (Noore, 2010). Thus, such 
scenario creates unproductive public institutions while maintaining the said 
unproductivity causes unhealthy economic development (Noore, 2010). 
Furthermore, corruption does not only affect the foreign direct investment 
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of the respective countries but also change their economic, political, and 
social structures (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). To address the seriousness of the 
corruption globally, United Nations introduced United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005. The main purpose of this convention 
is to highlight the prevention mechanism, corruption criminalisation, 
multinational and international cooperation, and asset recovery (Noore, 
2010). However, UNCAC does not highlight the issues of legal enforcement 
and prevention mechanism policy.
In Malaysia, a survey conducted by KPMG concluded that 65 percent 
respondents believed that corruption is a problem in their organisations. 80 
percent believed that corruption and bribery incidents have increased from 
2010 to 2013 and surprisingly 90 percent said that bribery and corruption 
have become a major problem in doing business in Malaysia. However, 
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) tries to ensure that the act 
of corruption can be handled accordingly based on the law by improving the 
investigation methods, education, and monitoring mechanism. This can only 
be achieved through comprehensive legal framework that can strengthen 
the power of MACC as an independent body.
In Singapore, corruption issues in the nineteenth centuries have become 
a problem. However,  the economic development of Singapore requires the 
public and private sectors to be more competent and transparent (Koh, 2012). 
As a result, according to the Transparency International, Singapore ranked 
highest in terms of transparency and free corruption country in South East 
Asia region. The change of political behaviour set up a policy to combat 
corruption cases by way of introducing comprehensive laws, enforcement, 
regulations, and self-regulation. The main reason that Singapore was 
included in this comparative study with Malaysian legal regime is because 
these countries share similar historical and legal background. Furthermore, 
Singapore, since its independence from the British Empire, has faced major 
problems particularly in corruption issues. 
OBJECTIVES
The first objective of this research is to identify the legal strengths and 
weaknesses of the current Malaysian legal regime. Secondly, this study 
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is meant to critically examine the Singapore legal regime by employing 
comparative analysis of the law particularly in legal framework against 
corruption. Finally, this study aims to recommend legislative improvements 
in the current Malaysian laws to enhance national integrity agenda through 
the government’s transformation program. 
SCOPES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
Several limitations were foreseeable which must be considered in this 
research. The question of secrecy of certain data, the willingness of the 
respondents to disclose sensitive data, and accuracy of legal provision 
by the reason of deference jurisdiction would be the main problems. 
Furthermore, this research did not examine the areas related to the theory 
of criminology but only examined the concept and legal framework in 
Malaysia and Singapore.
METHODOLOGY
This research employed a qualitative method in order to explore and discuss 
the Singapore and Malaysian legal frameworks against corruption. For that 
reason, this research was designed based on the primary and secondary data 
in providing comprehensive understanding on the laws in question.
Primary data of this research was obtained through a semi-structured 
interview which were conducted with the stakeholders such as Malaysia 
Anti-Corruption Agency, Attorney General Chambers, legal practitioners, 
members of Judiciary, police departments and legal academia.
In addition, the primary data was triangulated by the secondary data in 
providing a better analysis and comprehensive discussion of this research. 
These include articles, books, judicial precedents, Acts, and other necessary 
sources of law that are interrelated with the Malaysian and Singapore legal 
frameworks.
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SIGNIFICANCE
This research is mainly to assist policy makers, stakeholders, and the 
authorities who either directly or indirectly deal with the crime of corruptions 
in terms of drafting effective policies and procedures, empowering the 
enforcement agencies, and recommending comprehensive legal frameworks. 
Furthermore, this research is hoped to improve certain legal provisions 
stated in the Malaysian legal regime.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corruption has been defined in various ways. There are no standards 
and exact phases to describe the term corruption. Various organisations 
in the world have their own definitions of corruption. The general norm 
of corruption can be defined as ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ 
(Tanzi, 1998). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) classifies 
corruption into two main categories, spontaneous and institutionalised. Tanzi 
(1998) suggests that the cause of the rising number of corruption cases is 
inter-related with the lack and incompetency of regulations, laws, penalty 
systems, rules, and processes. This also includes the issues of transparency 
when the law itself indirectly protects the act of corruption where the 
public documents are not available to the public because of the secrecy 
under government confidential practices. Furthermore, the investigation 
of corruption cases is quite politically sensitive when political matters are 
involved. Therefore, the investigative institution must be free from any other 
influences to ensure the success and effectiveness of combating corruption. 
Hamin, Elias and Omar (2012) argue on the existence of corruption activities 
due to existing opportunities, motivations, and justifications. To combat 
corruption activities, policymakers must identify the sources of corruption 
and develop comprehensive legal frameworks by understanding the theories 
of opportunity, motivation, and justification. Opportunities exist when there 
are weaknesses in legal control and when the legal frameworks fail to fill up 
the legal weaknesses. Motivation takes place when there is lack of education 
on how to deal with surrounding factors which trigger the desire to commit 
the crime and justification that takes place where the surrounding and the 
practices of certain institutions indirectly allow corruption which becomes 
their working culture. In a more sophisticated economic environment, the 
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traditional definition of corruption and the theory surrounding it must look 
into the contributing factors from the public and private sectors (Kaufmann 
& Vicente, 2011). In order to understand the factors that contribute to the 
increasing number of corruption cases, perception is not a concrete evidence 
to justify any changes including legal reform. On the contrary, it requires 
in-depth analysis of the causes and effects of the corruption activities (Olken, 
2009). Thus, the government institutions and enforcement agencies must 
develop transparent mechanisms to monitor corruption activities and at the 
same time understand the nature of the actors and the crime itself (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993).This can be done by establishing an independent legal 
control to develop a dynamic legal regime (Lange, 2008). However, without 
political will and cultural determination, even an excellent law is unable to 
eradicate the corruption practice in total (Deflem, 1995). 
In Malaysia, the legal framework of corruption is mainly governed 
under the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (MACCA). 
This act set up the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) to 
cater the investigation process and initiate a prosecution under the power 
given by the Public Prosecutor. As far as the matter is concern, the power 
to prosecute, initiate and discontinue the prosecution lies only under the 
prosecution discretion that is governed under the Federal Constitution. 
Article 145 of the Federal Constitution states that ‘the attorney general has a 
power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any 
proceedings for an offence, other than proceeding before Syariah Court, at 
native court or court martial’. This section also incorporated under Section 
376 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) states that the attorney general 
shall be the public prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all 
criminal prosecutions and proceedings. To assist him, the public prosecutor 
may appoint and authorize other persons such as the assistant and deputy 
public prosecutors, advocates, police officers, officers of any government 
department, local authority or any statutory authority to conduct criminal 
prosecutions before any court or any inquiry before a magistrate’.
Tan (2008) argues that the power to prosecute only lies on the public 
prosecutors and no other person other than them. He also argues that the 
prosecutions must be done free, fair, and without the existence of mala fide 
(Dolak, 2004; Sharpe, 1995). Therefore, the power to prosecute other than 
the public prosecutors can be held unconstitutional. Tan (2008) suggests 
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that the power of prosecution as in Article 145 of the Federal Constitution 
must be amended. This provision carries a supreme authority that other 
enforcement agencies including MACC cannot initiate any criminal 
proceeding including corruption charges without the consent from public 
prosecutors. It must be noted that under the Malaysian legal framework, what 
has been laid down under the Federal Constitution, the Public Prosecutor, 
and the Attorney General is the same person under similar positions.
The courts address the seriousness of the acts of corruption and the 
importance to combat corruption at all level. In PP v. Ruhayah Yunus 
[2013] 1 LNS 843, the court ruled that, ‘much of be said and the of the evils 
of corruption and it is important for us to shoulder the responsibility together 
with the efforts to overcome this phenomenon so that corruption especially 
in the government delivery system and procurement be reduced and 
eradicated.’ In terms of evidence and tendering and evidence of corruption 
offences, the prosecution must able to supply credible evidence as per 
required beyond reasonable doubt. As in the case of Public Prosecutor v. 
Zul Hassan & Anor [2013] 1 LNS 141, the court ruled the common law 
was not applicable to admit the evidence of the intercepted telephone 
conversations as the admissibility of such exhibits was governed by the 
statutory provisions of Section 49 MACCA. It is trite law that the court 
cannot import common law principles from other jurisdictions if there 
are specific statutory provisions thereof. The evidence of the intercepted 
telephone conversations by the prosecution, if admitted, would be an 
important evidence for the prosecution to prove the involvement of the 
respondents in the act of corruption activities. Unfortunately, no certificate 
was signed by the Public Prosecutor as required under Section 39 MACCA in 
relation to the admissibility of the exhibits. Furthermore, the presumption 
of corruption must be carefully observed as the court ruled in order to 
invoke the statutory presumption under Section 42 MACCA. To establish 
an offence under Section 10(a)(aa) MACCA, it is not sufficient for the 
prosecution to establish that the accused has received the gratification. For 
this case, the prosecution had to prove that the purpose of the gratification 
contradicts the law. The circumstantial evidence was insufficient to infer 
that the accused had indeed accepted the gratification for the purpose of 
securing the proposed project. Thus, the prosecution had failed to prove that 
the money had been corruptly received. This case illustrates the importance 
of the investigative authorities to carry out the process of investigation in 
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accordance with high standards of evidence to obtain a conviction against 
the accused person. Furthermore, the prosecution is required to follow all 
the requirements stated under the respective statutory provision in relation 
to the tendering and evidence. It is within the guided discretion of the court 
whether or not to accept the evidence.
It becomes an important requirement that the ingredients of the 
offences have been fulfilled before successful convictions. It must be noted 
that the requirements for investigation and prosecution are different. The 
investigation can be commenced if there is a report and there is reasonable 
suspicion to initiate the investigation. However, for prosecution, it requires 
high degree of certainty. In KeeYiik Kwok v. Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 LNS 
75, the court stated; ‘Firstly, the prosecution must prove that a gratification 
was given or received by the appellant and secondly, at the time of payment 
or gift, as in the instant case, the receiver of the payment or gift is a public 
officer or in the employment of a public body. Once these two factual 
ingredients were proved then the existence of the third ingredient of the 
offence viz, that the gratification was paid or given or received, as the case 
may be, corruptly as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to 
do an act in relation to the affairs of that public officer or body is to be 
presumed unless the contrary is proved. The burden to rebut the presumption 
is on the accused or appellant and it is on the balance of probability’. It is 
submitted that, to rebut the presumption of gratification, the accused has to 
prove the balance of probabilities which requires less standard of evidence 
compared to beyond reasonable doubt.
In Singapore, the main legal framework is Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1960 which allows the creation of an independent body known as 
Corrupt Practice Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (Koh, 2012). For the purpose 
of investigation, CPIB has an extensive authority in terms of investigating 
not just the suspect, but also the suspect’s family or agents. It also has the 
power to examine their financial and other records, to require the attendance 
of witnesses for interview, to investigate any other sizable offence, which are 
disclosed in the course of a corruption investigation. The law enforcement 
agency is also given the powers of search and arrest individuals, as well 
as investigates bank accounts, share accounts, or purchase accounts of any 
suspect (Koh, 2012). The extensive power given under the legal framework 
allows the CPIB access all information that is required as to collect credible 
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evidence for prosecution purposes (Lichtman, 2004). Under Section 22G 
of the Singapore Constitution, it provides that: “Notwithstanding that the 
Prime Minister has refused to give his consent to the Director of the Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau to make any inquiries or to carry out any 
investigations into any information received by the Director touching upon 
the conduct of any person or any allegation or complaint made against any 
person, the Director may make such inquiries or carry out investigations 
into such information, allegation or complaint if the President, acting 
in his discretion, concurs therewith.” Thus, the Director of CPIB has a 
wide power in order to investigate without interference from government 
authorities. Therefore, CPIB is an independent body that is guarded by the 
Constitution of Singapore. This provision is extremely significant to ensure 
that, any other law cannot limit nor restrict the power of the CPIB Director 
to initiate any criminal investigation if there is a reasonable suspicion to 
begin the said proceeding. The main aspect of this provision is to prevent 
any interference while CPIB conducts any criminal investigation.
In respect of the law enforcement particularly at the prosecution stage, 
Singapore’s criminal legal process actively encourages plea bargaining to 
enhance the efficiency of the administration of criminal justice (Wang, 
2013). However, in certain aspects, plea bargaining has been criticised 
because the power solely relies on the prosecutors and without interference 
from the court (Schulhofer, 1984). Plea bargaining begins when lawyers 
representing accused persons routinely make written representations to 
the Attorney General Chambers with a view to having the charges against 
their clients withdrawn, reduced in severity or persuading the prosecution 
to proceed with fewer charges. However, any change as per charge 
depends on the evidence. The Attorney General Chambers will review all 
representations from the defence counsel and decide on them carefully 
based on the evidence collected through the investigation and examine the 
content of the investigation papers. If the representations are successful and 
acceded to, this will result in the accused pleading guilty to lesser charges, 
or pleading guilty to fewer charges or an acquittal based on the evidence. 
There are also certain instances where the prosecution applies to the Court 
for a discharge not amounting to an acquittal against the accused. If the Court 
allows the prosecution’s application, the prosecution will stay (Wang, 2013). 
In terms of the accepted standard of proof, the court in Public Prosecutor v. 
Peter Benedict Lim Sin Pang [2013] SGDC 192 ruled the knowledge of the 
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accused person as to have conflict of interest, which is an important element 
to identify the corruption practice. The definition of conflict of interest and 
the degree of seriousness of the offences are pertinent to the establishment 
of corruption offences. Thus, this case illustrates the approach by the court 
in Singapore with respect of the level of evidence requires for a conviction. 
Even the legal framework in Singapore is extensive in terms of 
investigation. Koh (2011) argues that there are challenges that must be 
overcome by reasons of the changing of corruption and the complexity 
of the transaction such as false accounting, phantom workers, and money 
mules. These require the CPIB to improve its investigation methods. 
Furthermore, the internationalisation of the corruption cases creates 
difficulties in investigation process due to the jurisdiction issues (Koh, 
2012). This includes the lack uniformity of international mutual assistance 
at the international level and requires multinational efforts and international 
laws to intervene (Posadas, 2000).
CONCLUSION
As a conclusion, this research examines the legal gap between Malaysian 
and Singapore legal frameworks pertaining to the corruption practice. 
This includes the statutory provision of each respective country, judicial 
precedent, institutional, and enforcement system in order to develop a 
systematic legal framework in Malaysia. 
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